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Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics has been subjected to 
severe emendation, no less in points where no scribe 
ever showed the slightest trace of hesitation. What I 
o%er below, in the form of a translation followed by a 
textual commentary, is an attempt to elucidate a dif-
&cult passage (EE II 2 1220a39–b6) following the MSS 
text. For ease of reference, other editions and transla-
tions of the same passage are printed as T1–T10 in 
the Appendix.1
ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ἦθος ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα σημαίνει, ὅτι 
ἀπὸ ἔθους ἔχει τὴν ἐπίδοσιν, ἐθίζεται δὲ τὸ ὑπ’ ἀγωγῆς 
μὴ ἐμφύτου τῷ πολλάκις κινεῖσθαί πως, οὕτως ἤδη τὸ 
ἐνεργητικόν, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις οὐχ ὁρῶμεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ 
ἂν μυριάκις ῥίψῃς ἄνω τὸν λίθον, οὐδέποτε ποιήσει τοῦτο 
μὴ βίᾳ· διὸ ἔστω ἦθος τοῦτο, ψυχῆς κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν 
λόγον δυναμένου δ’ ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ ποιότης.
And since character (êthos) is as its name indicates because it 
may develop on the basis of habit (ethos), and that is habituated 
<which is habituated> by a non-innate direction through being 
moved several times in a given way, eventually <becoming> 
that which is capable of activating, and we do not see <it> in 
inanimate beings, for not even if you throw a stone upwards 
ten thousand times will it ever do that, except by force—given 
that, be character this, a quality of the soul in accordance with 
command-giving reason, but of that which is capable of follo-
wing reason.
ἐστὶ ... ὥσπερ: With two seeming exceptions, edi-
tors and translators have avoided taking ὥσπερ with 
ἐστί in the passage. One should here be reminded of 
Estienne (1572) s.v. εἰμί: “Caeterum observandum est 
hoc loquendi genus, οὕτω πῃ τάδε γ’ ἐστὶ φίλον τέκος 
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ὡς ἀγορεύεις (Ω 373): ad verbum, Haec ita sunt, pro 
Haec ita se habent. Est autem in soluta etiam oratione 
frequentissimum hoc verbum, et variis modis.” In-
stances of εἶναι (instead of ἔχειν) with ὥσπερ in the 
sense of “being like/as” may be adduced from Aristo-
tle’s works: GA II 5 741a27–28, IV 5 773b31–32, V 1 
779b21–22; Met. Z 8 1033b24.
Punctuation and the lack of emendations in 
Manuzio (T1) and Bekker (T2) may suggest a reading 
along the same lines as that advanced here (or a mere 
refusal to intervene). Other editors and translators in-
sist on seeing ὥσπερ at the opening of an embedded 
clause, in most cases emending the text in di%erent 
ways in order to allow for such reading: Vettori (T1) 
puts a comma before ὥσπερ, thus taking ὥσπερ καί 
… σημαίνει as embedded; Fritzsche (T3) deletes ὅτι 
and emends ἔχει into ἔχον so as to have ἐστὶ … ἔχον 
= ἔχει, thus taking ὥσπερ καί … σημαίνει as embed-
ded; Susemihl (T4a) is followed by Solomon (T4b) 
and Simpson (T10) in taking τὸ ἐνεργητικόν as being 
equated with τὸ ἦθος in the passage, with ὥσπερ καί 
… κινεῖσθαί πως as embedded; Jackson (T5) is fol-
lowed by Dirlmeier (T7a) and Bloch-Leandri (T9) in 
reading ὅ τι and in taking ὥσπερ καί … σημαίνει as 
embedded (Solomon’s “something that” in T4b also 
follows Jackson’s emendation); Rackham (T6) takes 
ἐστί as absolute and ὥσπερ καί … μὴ βίᾳ as embed-
ded; Allan (probably a personal communication, 
not to be found in Allan (1961, p. 312) as noted in 
Walzer-Mingay’s critical apparatus, nor elsewhere in 
print) emends ἐπεί into ἔθει, thus taking ὥσπερ καί … 
σημαίνει as embedded; Russell (personal communica-
tion apud Walzer-Mingay’s critical apparatus) deletes 
ἐστί and ὅτι, thus taking τὸ ἦθος as subject of ἔχει and 
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ὥσπερ καί … σημαίνει as embedded; Walzer-Min-
gay (T8a) follow Russell and are in turn followed by 
Woods (T8b), Donini (T8c), Kenny (T8d); Inwood-
Woolf (T8e) take ὅτι = “because” with ἐστί absolute, 
and ὥσπερ καί … σημαίνει as embedded.
On purely grammatical grounds it is not neces-
sary to take ὥσπερ as opening an embedded clause. 
¨e objection may nevertheless be raised that in my 
proposal the assertion of a mere phonological coin-
cidence is used as a premise in an argument, but the 
clause introduced by ὅτι = “because” provides ade-
quate grounds for the reasoning.
ἔχει τὴν ἐπίδοσιν: ¨e potential value of the 
phrase, highlighted in LSJ s.v. ἐπίδοσις and evidently 
present in Plato, "t. 146b, may here imply only that 
habituation might in some cases not develop into a 
stable trait of character, not that character might be 
developed from anything else. ¨e lesson ἀπόδοσιν 
from Marc. (probably suggested by ἀπὸ ἔθους) has 
no place in our passage, since it would turn the 
whole &rst premiss of the argument into an asser-
tion of a mere linguistic fact (on which, see above). 
¨e parallel passage in the EN (II 1 1103a17–18)—
which, as Woods (1992, p.99) rightly points out, is 
concerned rather with the acquisition of virtue than 
with the development of character—employs a verb 
(παρεκκλῖνον, or παρεγκλῖνον in Kb) that, unlike 
the phrase used in our passage, describes exclusively 
the process of deriving a term from another.
τὸ ὑπ’ ἀγωγῆς μὴ ἐμφύτου: Some have tried to 
take ὑπ’ ἀγωγῆς or ὑπ’ ἀγωγῆς μὴ ἐμφύτου as agent 
of a passive verb in the passage. ¨us Fritzsche (T3) 
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displaces the de&nite article and emends ἐμφύτου 
into ἔμφυτον so as to have ὑπ’ ἀγωγῆς as agent of pas-
sive ἐθίζεται, with subject τὸ μὴ ἔμφυτον (which he 
translates as “id, quod natura quodammodo insitum 
est”); Dirlmeier (T7a) is followed by Bloch-Leandri 
(T9) in deleting the de&nite article so as to have ὑπ’ 
ἀγωγῆς μὴ ἐμφύτου as agent of passive ἐθίζεται; Ken-
ny (T8d) and Inwood-Woolf (T8e) take ὑπ’ ἀγωγῆς 
μὴ ἐμφύτου as agent of passive κινεῖσθαι. In a di%erent 
vein, on the basis of two emendations—one suggested 
by Ross, the other printed by Fritzsche (T3)—Solo-
mon (T4b) takes τὸ ὑπ’ ἀγωγὴν μὴ ἔμφυτον as the 
subject of ἐθίζεται. Taking the substantivated preposi-
tional phrase as subject of the main verb in the clause 
is, as Donini (1999: 203) rightly remarks, advisable, 
but no emendation seems to be necessary for such 
purpose: ἐθιζόμενον may be mentally supplied a«er 
μὴ ἐμφύτου.
οὕτως ἤδη: Estienne (1572) s.v. ἤδη gives τότ’ ἤδη 
and οὕτως ἤδη as equivalent to lat. tum demum = 
“then indeed,” “eventually,” “only then” (cf. also LSJ 
s.v. ἤδη 4.d). Instances of the phrase may be found 
in e.g. ¨ucydides I 64.3 (immediately following a 
καί); V 38.1 (immediately following a καί; opposed to 
πρῶτον), 76.2 (in a sequence from πρῶτον to αὖθις to 
καί οὕτως ἤδη); VI 48 (opposed to πρῶτον; a«er two 
aorist participles introduced by δέ), 49.4 (in a clause 
introduced by τε; opposed to ἄντικρυς = “straight-
way” 49.1). ¨e temporal meaning suits our context: 
that which is habituated (understood as that part of 
our soul undergoing habituation, not as the end re-
sult of a process of habituation) is initially subjected 
to guidance by another, but eventually comes to be 
able to activate movement by itself. If my reading is 
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correct, τὸ ἐνεργητικόν picks up on τὸ ὑπ’ ἀγωγῆς μὴ 
ἐμφύτου <ἐθιζόμενον>.
Twice in the Aristotelian corpus is ἤδη immediately 
preceded by οὕτως: In MM II 12 1212a23–24 ἤδη may 
either be inferential or mean “in that case” (note ἤδη 
1212a22), while οὕτως is clearly an adverb of man-
ner. In Top. V 3 132a11–13 ἔπειθ’ οὕτως ἤδη (“thence 
eventually”) may well seem excessive to mark a con-
trast with τὸ πρῶτον, but the temporal meaning is 
straightforward; on ἔπειθ’ οὕτως ἤδη as possibly re-
dundant, cf. ἔπειτα ὕστερον in Plato, Symp. 187b and 
Euthd. 278a.
τὸ ἐνεργητικόν: ¨e term ἐνεργητικόν was appar-
ently introduced by Aristotle. (Aëtius V 20.3 [DK 59 
A 101] reports the use of ἐνεργητικός as an adjective 
qualifying λόγος in Anaxagoras; the text, however, 
is corrupt, and the phrasing may be due to a later 
source.) ¨ e pair ἐνεργητικός–παθητικός for “active”–
“passive” is apparently of later coinage (Aristotle uses 
ποιητικός for “active”). ¨e term ἐνεργητικόν is used 
only once more in the works of Aristotle (Phys. III 
3 202a17 = Met. K 9 1066a31); there, it denotes that 
which is capable of activating movement in another. 
But what could that mean in our context? Reason is 
not itself habituated, and it is not clear what the non-
rational part of the soul that is able to follow reason 
could activate. ¨ree hypotheses: (i) ¨e non-rational 
but not altogether irrational part of the soul of some-
one who has undergone habituation is now capable 
of activating movement in the non-rational but not 
altogether irrational part of the soul of someone 
who is to undergo habituation. I take this option to 
be the least likely. (ii) Aspasius claims that both the 
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οἰκοδομικὴ τέχνη (105.12) and the ἠθικὴ ἕξις (105.21) 
are ἐνεργητικαί, the former τῶν περὶ οἰκοδομίαν 
ἐνεργειῶν, but such usage seems hardly Aristotelian, 
and is in any case diµcult to align with the passage 
from Phys. III 3 = Met. K 9. (iii) If τὸ ἐνεργητικόν is 
the same as τὸ κινητικόν (cf. Phys. III 3 202a13–21 = 
Met. Κ 9 1066a26–34), and τὸ κινητικόν is the same 
as τὸ ποιητικόν (cf. De An. III 2 426a4–6), then one 
may turn to MA 7 702a10–21 and see each item in 
the chain in 702a17–19 as capable of activating the 
item placed right below it—according to which pro-
posal, desire (and therefore character, since character 
is a quality of the desiring part of the soul) turns out 
to be capable of activating passion, which aligns well 
with what Aristotle says in the remainder of our chap-
ter (EE II 2 1220b7–20). Aristotle would thus have in 
mind the distinction between character (or rather dis-
positions of character) and passions, not the division 
of the soul into rational and non-rational parts, when 
speaking of that which, a«er a process of habituation, 
is made capable of activating movement in another.
καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις: Here we &nally &nd a textual 
variant: L has ὃ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, PC have καὶ ἐν τοῖς 
ἀψύχοις. L’s ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς seems to me irreconcilable 
with the following γάρ clause, while ὅ is not strictly 
necessary since transitive verbs may well have their 
objects omitted. PC’s καί, however, deserves scrutiny. 
In Aristotle’s works one &nds passages where καί in-
troduces a third premiss a«er a &rst premiss intro-
duced by ἐπεὶ δέ and a second premiss introduced by 
δέ: EE III 5 1232b27–31 [δέ l. 29, καί ibid.], Phys. IV 
12 220b32–221a9 [δέ l. 1, καί l. 4], Met. Θ 2 1046a15–
20 [δέ l. 16, καί l. 17]. Seen from that perspective, PC’s 
καί results not only acceptable, but even preferable to 
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L’s ὅ, contrary to what all editors except Manuzio (who 
knew only the lesson ὃ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς) seem to think. 
(¨e anacoluthon in the period, with διό opening the 
conclusion, will not result unfamiliar to any reader of 
Aristotle.) If the argument runs as I claim, its prem-
isses guarantee only the &rst element of the de#niens: 
“if character results from habituation, habituation in 
turn via repetition of movements imposed from with-
out eventually renders something capable of itself ac-
tivating movement, and repetition of movements im-
posed from without on inanimate beings never issues 
in such result, then character must belong to a soul.” 
¨e other elements of the de#niens may be implied in 
the reasoning in the way Woods (1992, p.99) claims, 
but are made explicit only in II 1 1219b26–1220a12.
ἔστω ἦθος τοῦτο κτλ.: Fritzsche (T3), Susemihl 
(T4a), Rackham (T6), Dirlmeier (T7a), Walzer-Min-
gay (T8a), Bloch-Leandri (T9) put a de&nite article 
before ἦθος. As for τοῦτο κτλ., Allan (personal com-
munication apud Walzer-Mingay’s critical apparatus) 
postulates a lacuna between τοῦτο and what follows; 
Dirlmeier (T7a) emends τοῦτο into τοῦ and inserts 
ἀλόγου; Walzer-Mingay (T8a) take τοῦτο to be cor-
rupt and put it between obeli. No such interventions 
are necessary: cf. De Int. 17a33–34 καὶ ἔστω ἀντίφασις 
τοῦτο, κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις αἱ ἀντικείμεναι.
δυναμένου δ’: Fritzsche (T3) is followed by Su-
semihl (T4a), Ross (1918), Walzer-Mingay (T8a) in 
inserting <τοῦ ἀλόγου μὲν> before δυναμένου δ’; 
Dirlmeier (T7a) deletes δ’ and takes δυναμένου κτλ. 
with τοῦ ἀλόγου ψυχῆς (see above for his correction 
of τοῦτο into τοῦ and his insertion of ἀλόγου); Al-
lan (see above) postulates a lacuna before δυναμένου 
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δ’. No such interventions are necessary if one takes 
δυναμένου δ’ as further specifying ψυχῆς: the qual-
ity belongs indeed to the soul, but more speci&cally 
to that of the soul which is capable of following rea-
son. ¨e marginal note δυναμένη by the second hand 
of P, probably in¸uenced by Stobaeus II vii 1 38.12–
13 Wachsmuth-Hense ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρους 
ποιότης κατ’ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον δυναμένη τῷ λογικῷ 
ἐπακολουθεῖν, in turn adopted by Rackham (T6), is 
incorrect: it is a part of the soul, not a quality of a part 
of the soul, that is capable of following reason.
Appendix
In the Greek text, underlining indicates interven-
tions by editors. In the translation, underlining indi-
cates deviations from the Greek text being followed.
T1. Manuzio (1498, p.254) c. adn. Vettori
ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ἦθος[, V] ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα 
σημαίνει, ὅτι ἀπὸ ἔθους ἔχει τὴν ἐπίδοσιν· ἐθίζεται δὲ 
τὸ ὑπ’ ἀγωγῆς μὴ ἐμφύτου[, V] τῷ πολλάκις κινεῖσθαί 
πως, οὕτως ἤδη τὸ ἐνεργητικόν, ὃ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς [καὶ 
ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις V] οὐχ ὁρῶμεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν μυριάκις 
ῥίψῃς ἄνω τὸν λίθον, οὐδέποτε ποιήσει τοῦτο μὴ βίᾳ· 
διὸ ἔστω ἦθος τοῦτο ψυχῆς κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον 
δυνάμει δ’ ἀκολουθεῖν [δυναμένου δ’ ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ 
λόγῳ V] ποιότης.
T2. Bekker (1831)
ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ἦθος ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα σημαίνει 
ὅτι ἀπὸ ἔθους ἔχει τὴν ἐπίδοσιν, ἐθίζεται δὲ τὸ ὑπ’ 
ἀγωγῆς μὴ ἐμφύτου τῷ πολλάκις κινεῖσθαί πως, οὕτως 
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ἤδη τὸ ἐνεργητικόν. ὃ ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις οὐχ ὁρῶμεν· 
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν μυριάκις ῥίψῃς ἄνω τὸν λίθον, οὐδέποτε 
ποιήσει τοῦτο μὴ βίᾳ. διὸ ἔστω ἦθος τοῦτο ψυχῆς 
κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον, δυναμένου δ’ ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ 
λόγῳ ποιότης.
T3. Fritzsche (1851, p.31, 278)
ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ἦθος, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα σημαίνει 
[ὅτι], ἀπὸ ἔθους ἔχον τὴν ἐπίδοσιν, ἐθίζεται δὲ ὑπ’ 
ἀγωγῆς τὸ μὴ ἔμφυτον τῷ πολλάκις κινεῖσθαί πως 
οὕτως ἤδη τὸ ἐνεργητικόν, ὃ ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις οὐχ 
ὁρῶμεν (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν μυριάκις ῥίψῃς ἄνω τὸν λίθον, 
οὐδέποτε ποιήσει τοῦτο μὴ βίᾳ). διὸ ἔστω <τὸ> ἦθος 
τοῦτο ψυχῆς κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον, <τοῦ ἀλόγου 
μὲν> δυναμένου δ’ ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ ποιότης.
Quoniam vero τὸ ἦθος, ut nomen etiam declarat, 
ἀπὸ ἔθους, hoc est a consuetudine, incrementa capit: 
in consuetudinem autem id, quod natura quodam-
modo insitum est, tum venit, quum vis operatrix 
saepe certo quodam modo movetur, quod quidem in 
rebus inanimatis non observatur (neque enim lapis, 
tametsi millies sursum iactatus fuerit, unquam nul-
la admota vi sursum volitabit): idcirco dicatur ἦθος 
illud animi, qualitas eius facultatis, quae rationis 
quidem expers est, at obsequi tamen et obtemperare 
potest rationi.
T4a. Susemihl (1884)
ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ἦθος, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα σημαίνει 
ὅτι ἀπὸ ἔθους ἔχει τὴν ἐπίδοσιν, ἐθίζεται δὲ τὸ ὑπ’ 
ἀγωγῆς μὴ ἐμφύτου τῷ πολλάκις κινεῖσθαι πώς, 
οὕτως ἤδη τὸ ἐνεργητικόν, ὃ ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις οὐχ 
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ὁρῶμεν (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν μυριάκις ῥίψῃς ἄνω τὸν λίθον, 
οὐδέποτε ποιήσει τοῦτο μὴ βίᾳ), διὸ ἔστω <τὸ> ἦθος 
τοῦτο ψυχῆς κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον <τοῦ ἀλόγου 
μὲν,> δυναμένου δ’ ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ ποιότης.
T4b. Solomon (1925), Solomon-Barnes (1984)
But since the character, being as its name indicates 
something that grows by habit—and that which is un-
der guidance other than innate [ἀγωγὴν (W.D.R.) μὴ 
ἔμφυτον (Fr.)] is trained to a habit by frequent move-
ment of a particular kind—is the active principle pre-
sent a«er this process, but in things inanimate we do 
not see this (for even if you throw a stone upwards 
ten thousand times, it will never go upward except by 
compulsion),—consider, then, character to be this, 
viz. a quality in accordance with governing reason be-
longing to the irrational part of the soul which is yet 
able to obey the reason.
T5. Jackson apud Ross (1918, p.156)
ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ἦθος, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα σημαίνει, 
ὅ τι ἀπὸ ἔθους ἔχει τὴν ἐπίδοσιν, ...
T6. Rackham (1935)
ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ἦθος—ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα σημαίνει 
ὅτι ἀπὸ ἔθους ἔχει τὴν ἐπίδοσιν, ἐθίζεται δὲ τὸ ὑπ’ 
ἀγωγῆς μὴ ἔμφυτον τῷ πολλάκις κινεῖσθαί πως 
οὕτως ἤδη [τὸ] ἐνεργητικόν (ὃ ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις οὐχ 
ὁρῶμεν, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν μυριάκις ῥίψῃς ἄνω τὸν λίθον 
οὐδέποτε ποιήσει τοῦτο μὴ βίᾳ)—διὸ ἔστω τὸ ἦθος 
τοῦτο, ψυχῆς κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον δυναμένη 
ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ ποιότης.
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And since moral character is, as even its name im-
plies that it has its growth from habit, and by our o«en 
moving in a certain way a habit not innate in us is &-
nally trained to be operative in that way (which we do 
not observe in inanimate objects, for not even if you 
throw a stone upwards ten thousand times will it ever 
rise upward unless under the operation of force)—let 
moral character then be de&ned as a quality of the 
spirit in accordance with governing reason that is ca-
pable of following the reason.
T7a. Dirlmeier (1962, p.240, 22–3)
ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ἦθος, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα σημαίνει, 
ὅ τι ἀπὸ ἔθους ἔχει τὴν ἐπίδοσιν, ἐθίζεται δὲ [τὸ] ὑπ’
ἀγωγῆς μὴ ἐμφύτου τῷ πολλάκις κινεῖσθαι πώς, 
οὕτως ἤδη τὸ ἐνεργητικόν – ὃ ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις οὐχ 
ὁρῶμεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν μυριάκις ῥίψῃς ἄνω τὸν λίθον, 
οὐδέποτε ποιήσει τοῦτο μὴ βίᾳ. διὸ ἔστω <τὸ> ἦθος 
τοῦ[το] <ἀλόγου> ψυχῆς, κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον, 
δυναμένου [δ’] ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ ποιότης.
Indem aber der Charakter (ēthos), wie auch der 
Name anzeigt, etwas ist was sich von der Gewön-
nung (ethos) her ausbildet, der Gewöhnungsprozeß 
aber vor sich geht durch eine Führung, die keine an-
geborene ist, vermittels häu&gen, in bestimmter Art 
erfolgenden Bewegtwerdens, ist er auf diese Weise 
letzten Endes das aktivierende Element. Das ist etwas 
was wir beim Unbelebten nicht beobachten können, 
denn auch dann wenn du den Stein unzähligemale in 
die Höhe wirfst, wird er dies (das Steigen) niemals tun 
ohne Zwang. Daher soll gelten: der Charakter ist eine 
Bescha%enheit des irrationalen Seelenelements, das in 
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der Lage ist, nach Maßgabe des befehlenden Ration-
alen dem Rationalen zu folgen. 
T7b. Transl. of Dirlmeier’s text in Donini (1999, p.203)
Ora, poiché il carattere è (come anche signi&ca il 
suo nome) ciò che deriva il suo sviluppo dall’abitudi-
ne e si abitua, sotto la guida di un principio che non è 
innato, in quanto molte volte sia mosso in un determi-
nato modo, così esso è allora capace di attività – il che 
non vediamo avvenire negli oggetti inanimati; neppu-
re se getti migliaia di volte in aria una pietra essa farà 
mai questo movimento se non per forza. Resti perciò 
stabilito che il carattere è una qualità della parte dell’a-
nima irrazionale capace di seguire la ragione confor-
mandosi a una direttiva razionale.
T8a. Walzer-Mingay (1991)
ἐπεὶ δ’ {ἐστὶ} τὸ ἦθος, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα σημαίνει, 
{ὅτι} ἀπὸ ἔθους ἔχει τὴν ἐπίδοσιν, ἐθίζεται δὲ τὸ ὑπ’ 
ἀγωγῆς μὴ ἐμφύτου τῷ πολλάκις κινεῖσθαί πως, 
οὕτως ἤδη {τὸ} ἐνεργητικόν (ὃ ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις οὐχ 
ὁρῶμεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν μυριάκις ῥίψῃς ἄνω τὸν λίθον, 
οὐδέποτε ποιήσει τοῦτο μὴ βίᾳ)—διὸ ἔστω <τὸ> ἦθος 
†τοῦτο†, ψυχῆς κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον <τοῦ ἀλόγου 
μὲν,> δυναμένου δ’ ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ ποιότης.
T8b. Woods (1992)
Now character (ēthos), as the word itself indicates, 
is developed from habit (ethos); and anything is ha-
bituated which, as a result of guidance which is not in-
nate, through being changed a certain way repeatedly, 
is eventually capable of acting in that way—something 
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we do not see in inanimate things. (A stone, even if 
you throw it upwards ten thousand times, will never 
do so except under compulsion.) So let character be 
thus de&ned: a quality of the part of the soul that is 
non-rational, but capable of following reason, in ac-
cordance with a prescriptive principle.
T8c. Donini (1999)
Ora, poiché il carattere (come anche signi&ca il suo 
nome) ha il suo sviluppo dall’abitudine e si abitua ciò 
che è sottoposto a una guida che non è innata in quan-
to molte volte è mosso in un dato modo, così esso è 
allora capace di attività (il che non vediamo accadere 
negli oggetti inanimati; neppure se getti migliaia di 
volte in aria una pietra essa farà mai questo movimen-
to se non per forza) – perciò resti stabilito che il carat-
tere è, conformemente a una direttiva razionale, una 
qualità della parte dell’anima irrazionale, ma capace 
di seguire la ragione.
T8d. Kenny (2011)
Now, character (ēthos), as the word itself indicates, 
is developed from habit (ethos), and an agent acquires 
a habit when it eventually becomes operative in a par-
ticular fashion as the result of the repetition of a certain 
motion under some non-innate impulse. (¨is is some-
thing we do not see inanimate agents: a stone, even if 
you throw it upwards ten thousand times, will never do 
that except by force.) So let character be de&ned as a 
quality governed by the prescriptions of reason, which 
inheres in that part of the soul which, although non-
rational, is capable of obedience to reason.
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T8e. Inwood-Woolf (2013)
Character exists, as the name signi&es, because it 
develops from habit, and a thing gets habituated as a 
result of a pattern of conduct that is not innate, by re-
peated movement of one sort or another, so that it is 
eventually capable of being active in that way. We do 
not see that in lifeless entities: however many times 
you hurl a stone upwards, it will never do this without 
being forced to. Let character, then, be a quality of the 
part of the soul that is irrational, but capable of follow-
ing reason, in line with reason’s ability to command.
T9. Bloch-Leandri (2011)
ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ἦθος, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα σημαίνει, 
ὅ τι ἀπὸ ἔθους ἔχει τὴν ἐπίδοσιν, ἐθίζεται δὲ [τὸ] 
ὑπ’ ἀγωγῆς μὴ ἐμφύτου τῷ πολλάκις κινεῖσθαι πώς, 
οὕτως ἤδη [τὸ] ἐνεργητικόν (ὃ ἐν [τοῖς] ἀψύχοις οὐχ 
ὁρῶμεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν μυριάκις ῥίψῃς ἄνω τὸν λίθον, 
οὐδέποτε ποιήσει τοῦτο μὴ βίᾳ)· διὸ ἔστω <τὸ> 
ἦθος τοῦ <ἀλόγου> ψυχῆς κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον 
δυναμένη ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ ποιότης.
Puisque, comme le nom même l’indique, le caractère 
est quelque chose qui se forme par l’habitude, et que 
l’habitude naît de ce qu’on est soumis à l’action d’un 
mouvement non naturel, par la répétition de ce mouve-
ment dans un sens déterminé, le caractère devient dès 
lors principe d’activité (ce phénomène n’apparaît pas 
chez les êtres inanimés, car on aura beau jeter une pierre 
em l’air mille fois, elle ne fera jamais ce mouvement que 
par violence); dé&nissons donc le caractère comme la 
qualité de la partie irrationelle de l’âme qui, au contact 
de la raison impérative, est capable d’obéir à la raison.
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T10. Simpson (2013)
But since one’s moral character – as its name also sig-
ni&es, because it gets its increase from custom and be-
cause what is under a guidance not innate gets to have 
a custom by being changed repeatedly in a certain way 
– is now in this way the activating part (which we do 
not see in lifeless things, for even if you threw a stone 
upward ten thousand times it will never not do this by 
force), therefore let a moral character be this, a quality 
of soul in accord with a reason in command of a being-
able to follow reason. We must say, then, what qualities 
in accord with what in the soul moral characters are.
Notes
1  I would like to thank everyone with whom I discussed a 
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